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developing countries would be substantively addressed under this approach,
in return for the commitments that may have to be undertaken in key
services. It is uncertain whether there would be a balanced outcome from such
negotiations. It is thus not surprising that many developing countries and
least-developed countries (LDCs) have misgivings about the complementary
approach, despite assurances that the GATS’ negotiating architecture would
not be undermined.
But whether or not the services negotiations receive an impetus from the
Hong Kong Declaration and the new modalities, the GATS negotiations pro-
vide all countries with an opportunity to take stock of and develop their
domestic regulatory and institutional frameworks in services, with active
involvement from all domestic stakeholders. In this regard, the plurilateral
approach may put additional pressure on some of the major developing coun-
tries to assess the institutional and regulatory deficiencies in their key service
sectors and to adopt a more proactive domestic reform agenda in services,
which may prove to be a gain in itself.
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M I K E  WA G H O R N E
Public Services International, France
‘I Got My Annex!’
(mike waghorne is the Assistant General Secretary of Public Services International in
Ferney-Voltaire, France.)
That heading is the triumphant summary of the services negotiations at the
sixth World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Hong
Kong in December 2005 by the Mexican Ambassador to the WTO, Fernando
de Mateo. He also chairs the Council on Trade in Services in Special Session,
the body responsible for supervising the services negotiations.
The Annex to which he refers is the infamous Annex C to the final
Ministerial Declaration adopted in Hong Kong and we will come back to that,
but first a little history and some context.
The current round of WTO negotiations, the so-called Doha Development
Round, is posited on the ‘agreement’ adopted in Doha in 2001 that the new
Round of negotiations would have a development focus, in which the trading
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and development interests of developing countries would take pride of place.
Gone, for once, would be the usual mercantilist approach to negotiations,
in which my country only makes concessions to yours or others if we get
something equivalent in return – a ‘fair deal’. Doha recognized that there
can be no such fair deals when the outcome of previous rounds has been so
unbalanced. This round was going to level the playing field somewhat. So, the
principle of non-reciprocity was accepted – the developing countries could ask
for and get deals for which they did not have to make a ‘fair’ offer in return.
The problem is that the North basically decided to go back on the deal and
to ask that a very large number of developing countries, at least, must work on
a tit-for-tat basis. That’s what partially wrecked Cancún – the North was
asking for very significant new concessions, notably the so-called Singapore
issues, from the South.
By July 2004, it was clear that all pretence about a development round had
gone and the North started to increase its demands, starting with the July
Package of 2004. This certainly was evident in the intransigent positions the
EU and the USA were taking over agriculture, making ‘offers’ that would
make substantially no real difference to developing countries’ market access,
and in the non-Agriculture Market Access negotiations. In the latter, the
North was essentially asking the South to wipe out huge swathes of their
tariffs (something the North had never even contemplated at their own equiv-
alent stage of industrial development), leading to the spectre of industries in
the South being turned into graveyards and of the South foregoing any
chance of its own indigenous industrial development.
To top it all off, the EU decided that the services negotiations were
progressing far too slowly and they wanted to see a significant opening of
services markets if they were going to be ‘generous’ on agricultural offers.
Developing countries with whom we have met have told us that they regard
this claim of slowness as ridiculous: negotiations have been going on in agri-
culture for over 50 years and there is still not decent market access for many
developing countries. In contrast, they say, negotiations under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have been going for only 10 years
and there has been considerable work done in this area.
By early 2005, the EU and several other Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries upped the ante further.
Progress is so slow, they said, that we are going to introduce a new approach
to the services negotiations: ‘benchmarking’. Each country would be required
to make services commitments in a specified number of services (depending
on the kind of country). Further, your commitments each had to make an
actual difference to market access. Countries would be ranked on how they
measured up and this would be used for/against them in other negotiations.
In addition, they set clear targets for improvements in each mode of services
trade. Crucially, under Mode 3, the opening of commercial presence, foreign
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equity ownership of at least 51% would be required. In other words, a
takeover of developing country services sectors by Northern multinationals.
Significantly, the only area where such tough requirements were not speci-
fied in these OECD country benchmarks was Mode 4 – the opening of access
for the temporary movement of service providers, the main demand of devel-
oping countries in these negotiations and one that the North did not want to
open up.
The South roundly condemned this whole approach – now called ‘comple-
mentary approaches’, to hide the raw benchmarking tone. As the October
General Council meeting, which would set the draft text for Hong Kong
adoption, approached, the pressure to agree on a draft services text – which
became Annex C to the final Declaration – was mounting. On 18 October, a
number of trade unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) met
with Ambassador de Mateo. We discussed benchmarking and the draft serv-
ices text. He agreed that there was no convergence on quantitative bench-
marking, although he maintained that there was convergence on the need to
discuss it. An Indian NGO member suggested that one member state was
working on the draft text. Ambassador de Mateo expressed surprise that any-
one was working on a draft but said he would love to see it because he had
only been the Chair for two weeks and was not sure what he wanted to write
yet – had not even started.
Two days later, the full draft, translated into all the WTO languages,
appears. Pretty fast work for a man who had no idea where to start! And, sur-
prise, surprise, the text had everything the EU wanted, even though it was
clear this had been totally rejected by the bulk of a membership that prides
itself on working by consensus. It even included a requirement that, if a group
of countries asked you to take part in plurilateral negotiations on a particular
service, you had to enter negotiations. This generated a flurry of letters from
NGOs and trade unions to Director General Pascal Lamy asking how he
could possibly square this draft with claims about all Hong Kong texts being
drawn up on the basis of consensus and GATS flexibility.
Many member state delegations also made their objections clear and told us
of their support for our public correspondence with Lamy. Some met with us
to discuss possible tactics.
THENCE TO HONG KONG
Here was the most contentious services text ever produced at the WTO, the
most contentious issue at the Ministerial and they spent the first two days
studiously refusing to discuss it. The strategy was clear: leave it until it was so
late that any attempt to torpedo the text would also torpedo the entire
Ministerial. Which country wanted that opprobrium?
The Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and the G90 made their displeasure clear. An
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alternative text was proposed by the G90 but Hyung Chong Kim, the Korean
minister facilitating the services talks, and the WTO secretariat managed to
use bureaucratic tricks to keep this off the agenda for half a day. Green room
discussions went on all night of 17 December and up until the morning of
18 December it was not clear that a services text would be agreed.
Finally, the text that emerged:
● Deleted the compulsory quantitative approach but preserved the idea of
plurilateral negotiations
● Downgraded the plurilateral negotiations from compulsory to voluntary
● Preserved the EU text on how the various modes of trade would be
treated, as well as reaffirming a set of modal and sectoral objectives sought
by the North
● Mandated further discussions on domestic regulations, again on a basis
not agreed by all members; and,
● Established a programme of work for 2006 that will see a number of pluri-
lateral sectoral requests developed by February, followed by a further
set of offers to be developed by the end of July and then full schedules of
commitments by 31 October.
Please address correspondence to: Mike Waghorne, Assistant General Secretary, Public
Services International, Place de l’Eglise, 29770 Esquibien, France. [email: Mike.
Waghorne@world-psi.org]
R I A Z  TAY O B
Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute, South Africa
The World Trade Organization: Hegemony and Theory in
Practice
(riaz tayob is the Country Director of the Southern and Eastern African Trade
Information and Negotiations Institute [SEATINI] in South Africa; http//www.
seatini.org)
There is a large palette of new thinking that has broadened and is being deep-
ened in many of the social science disciplines. However, developments in eco-
nomics, with almost unique singularity, failed to translate into different policy
prescriptions of the many international economic institutions like the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Powerful vested interests in economic thought
and its application have ensured a market fundamentalist adherence to
Classical Economics. The dominance of Classical Economics in economic
governance has contributed to the wholesale purging of ideas and almost
extinction of some species of academic teaching, like Schumpetarianism,
while less fashionable ones like Marxism have suffered ridicule, notwith-
standing their impact on other disciplines and useful predictive insights. The
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